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  1 
Introduction 
 
Theories and analyses of social class form an enduring sociological 
tradition extending back to 19th century Europe.  Social class was, of course, 
important in the work of Max Weber (1947: 424-29) and especially central to the 
writings of Karl Marx ([1894] 1967) and a wide array of subsequent neo-Marxists 
(e.g., Wright 1985; Davis 1986).  While class analyses are highly heterogeneous 
and cut in many different directions, one critical question centers on whether 
class matters in the contemporary United States political arena.  Class could 
matter through objective or material conditions under which people live, or it 
might matter in terms of how individuals think about themselves in class terms.  
Here I am concerned with how individual class identity might influence political 
orientations of American adults, such as party identification, orientations toward 
government policies, and voting patterns. 
A combination of conditions has emerged over the last several decades to 
weaken scholarly interest in the role of class in politics in Western capitalist 
democracies like the United States.  First, studies using objective measures of 
class (e.g., the Alford Index) have been criticized for their inability to 
appropriately capture modern class positions (more below).  Second, 
postindustrial transformations (e.g., Bell 1973) have led some scholars to 
proclaim the withering away of the working class (Zolberg 1995; Gorz 1997) and 
especially the declining significance of class generally for politics (e.g., Hechter 
2004).  Finally, other authors point to the rise of “identity politics” since the 1960s, 
which valorize the role of group status—gender, race, ethnicity—over basic 
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economic concerns historically connected to class as central in shaping modern 
political positions and activism (e.g., Aronowitz 1992; Calhoun 1994; Wiley 1994; 
Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Dean 1997; Bernstein 2005; Gupta 2007).  With the 
growing diversity and political salience of such non-class identities (Weakliem 
2001), some see the previous influence of class in shaping social life as 
diminished and overshadowed by other identities in contemporary Western 
societies (Walsh 2004). 
 One might expect that the rise of identity politics would have spawned an 
increase in studies of the role of class identity, but with the focus remaining on 
other such identities as gender, race, and ethnicity, this has not been the case.  
Research on class identity has been limited, with most of the literature focused 
on its determinants (e.g., Yamaguchi and Wang 2002; Newman and Tanner-
Smith 2008), not its consequences.  While there has been some earlier research 
on the influence of class identity on political orientations in the United States 
(e.g., Centers 1950; Eulau 1956; Jackman and Jackman 1983), there is much we 
do not know about the role of class identity in modern American politics.   
 Demonstrating differences in individuals’ political orientations based on 
their class identities would support the argument that social class has both a 
subjective reality and relevant consequences in modern America through this 
political influence.  By focusing on political orientation outcomes, we are able to 
better understand “the ‘grass roots’ impact of class” as opposed to discrete 
political actions such as voting, which are limited by electoral options (Jackman 
and Jackman 1983: 192).  In addition, political orientations are important 
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because of the strong influence of public opinion on government policies (Cook, 
Barabas, and Page 2002) as well as their influence in voting decisions (Beck et 
al. 2002).  If there is empirical variation in political orientations among those who 
identify with different classes, that would encourage further research on other 
possible outcomes that may be shaped by class identity.  Moreover, evidence on 
how this relationship may have changed over the last several decades could 
provide empirical support for or against popular media notions that the white 
working class is becoming more conservative (e.g., Frank 2004; Lappin 2006).  
From another angle, it also could provide the basis for future research 
concerning the understanding of other determinants that may influence political 
orientations and how they may have changed over time.  However, if the data do 
not indicate a significant class identity effect, then at least in the realm of 
subaltern identities, more attention could be focused on other possible predictors 
of political orientations (e.g., race, ethnicity, gender, region, religion). 
The paper proceeds by first reviewing literature on class and its 
relationship to politics.  Second, I derive a series of hypotheses from this 
literature.  Third, I describe my data and methods.  Fourth, I present my findings.  
Finally, I draw conclusions and implications from the findings. 
 
Research on Class-Based Politics 
The term “class” did not appear in the European lexicon until the 18th 
century (Calhoun 1994).  Prior to industrial capitalism, stratification was based 
primarily on estates—clergy, nobility, and citizens (Marx and Engels [1848] 
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1959).  In its most basic form, class can be seen as involving “a criterion or set of 
criteria in terms of which individuals may be ranked descriptively along a scale” 
(Giddens 1973: 106).  In Marx’s conceptualization, the proletariat consisted of 
workers who provided labor and were exploited by capitalists (or bourgeoisie) 
who owned the means of production.  For Marx, there were other class 
categories (e.g., landowners, lumpenproletariat), but in the course of struggle 
induced by the logic of capitalism, individuals would tend to be divided into two 
opposing classes (i.e., the proletariat and the bourgeoisie) (Marx and Engels 
[1848] 1959). 
The influence of class in the 19th and early 20th centuries can be seen 
clearly in the workers’ movements that took place around the globe, where 
confrontations were common between workers and their employers (as well as 
the authorities).  Workers shared a collective interest in fighting for their political 
and economic rights (Hechter 2004).  This social action emanated from 
individuals who shared social conditions, which influenced their life outlooks.  
The influence of class on the political viewpoints of individuals is also important 
for views on specific political issues (e.g., Eulau 1956; Jackman and Jackman 
1983) as well as voting (e.g. Stonecash and Mariani 2000; McCarty, Poole, and 
Rosenthal 2006; Isaac, Harrison, and Lipold 2008)—in other words, political 
orientations.  In short, there is an impressive history and substantial literature that 
suggests that politics—both institutionalized and movements—in capitalist 
societies is shaped, at least in part, by various dimensions of social class. 
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Objective conditions of class 
Much of the research concerning the relationship between class and 
political orientations in the 20th century used objective measures of class as 
opposed to the subjective understanding of one’s class identity.  Many of these 
studies have relied on the Alford Index, which splits classes into those who 
engage in manual versus nonmanual work and uses those categories to explain 
left/right party voting (e.g., Pakulsiki and Waters 1996; Evans 1999; Clark 2001; 
Clark and Lipset 2001; Clark, Lipset, and Rempel 2001).  Research using the 
Alford Index provides evidence of a decreasing relationship between class and 
political orientations over the last half of the twentieth century (e.g., Pakulski and 
Waters 1996; Niewbeerta and DeGraaf 1999; Clark and Lipset 2001; Clark, 
Lipset and Rempel 2001).  But there are serious weaknesses inherent in the 
Alford Index, including its singular focus on the manual/nonmanual distinction as 
a proxy for class.  Its simplistic strategy of dichotomizing class cannot account for 
the complexities of class in modern day society, and “major conceptual problems 
arise over where to place the wide array of intermediary parties” as well (Manza 
and Brooks 1996: 720).  The Alford Index also fails to consider any changes in 
general popularity of political parties (Heath, Jowell, and Curtice 1985).  In 
addition, it does not take into consideration the relationship between class and 
voting that might be due to nonvoting (Manza and Brooks 1996).  Therefore, how 
much of the apparent weakening in the relationship between class and political 
orientations during the second half of the 20th century is real or due to 
measurement invalidity is unclear. 
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On balance, the research employing objective measures of class to 
examine the class-politics relationship in the U.S. finds a mix of empirical 
evidence.  Some analysts find evidence for a declining trend in the salience of 
class-based politics (e.g., Clark and Lipset 2001; Clark, Lipset, and Rempel 
2001; Hechter 2004) while others point to a persistence of class influence (e.g., 
Goldthorpe 2001; Hout, Brooks, and Manza 2001; Weakliem 2001).  There is 
also evidence that the conventional methods of analyzing class increasingly 
underestimate its effects on social and political life (Houtman 2003) (more 
below). 
Class Identity 
Another way of looking at class focuses on the subjective, the class with 
which an individual identifies (“subjective class identity” or “class identity”), as 
opposed to class defined as objective characteristics (e.g., occupation, 
ownership—or not—of capital).  Using subjective class identification “involves 
both self-evaluation and self enchantment as in social comparison processes 
(Gruder 19971), and it reflects not only the person’s present class situation but 
his or her prospects for future class attainment” (Yamaguchi and Wang 2002: 
445).  Richard Centers (1949) was an early forerunner on this question and 
found that the two largest classes with which individuals identified in the United 
States were the working and middle classes (when given options of lower, 
working, middle, and upper), with working class holding a slight numerical edge 
at that historical moment (Vanneman and Cannon 1987).   
                                            
1 Cited within Yamaguchi and Wang 2002 
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Research concerning subjective class identity goes beyond the univariate 
strategy of simply describing the distribution of identity, with a substantial body of 
research focusing on the determinants of class identity.  Mary and Robert 
Jackman analyzed possible determinants using data collected in the 1970s.  In 
obtaining the respondents’ class identity, the question read, 
People talk about social classes such as the poor, the working class, the middle class, 
the upper middle class, and the upper class. Which of these classes would you say you 
belong to? (Jackman and Jackman 1983: 14) 
 
The Jackmans’ (1983) use of five different classes not only placed the middle 
class truly in the middle of possible responses, but also allowed respondents to 
have non-middle class choices that were not polar extremes.  As one might 
expect in United States context (Griffin and Isaac 2001), the middle class was 
modal, with 43.3 percent self-identifying as such.  However, working class was a 
close second, with 36.6 percent.  Poor, upper middle, and upper class accounted 
for 7.6, 8.2, and 1.0 percent respectively (Jackman and Jackman 1983).   
         Mary and Robert Jackman (1983) found that occupational prestige, 
education, skill, income, and job authority all influenced class identity.  Each of 
these variables had a significant positive effect on the class with which 
respondents identified.  However, the distinction between manual and 
nonmanual jobs did not have a significant effect.  Although they found no 
significant difference in the relationship between socioeconomic status and class 
identity by sex, there was a difference by race, with this relationship being “weak 
or nonexistent” for black respondents (Jackman and Jackman 1983: 82).  
Jackman and Jackman (1983) theorized that this difference was due to a 
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different set of attitudes concerning social class among blacks.  For African-
Americans in general, social class identity appears secondary to racial identity.2  
Central to the present research, however, are possible consequences of 
subjective class identity, especially its effect(s) on political orientations.  
Research in the 1940s showed that members of working and lower classes were 
more likely to support the Democratic Party and the New Deal than were 
individuals in the other classes (Centers 1950).  Richard Centers expanded on 
this line of inquiry with his research on class identity’s effect on political 
orientation, specifically the support for Franklin Roosevelt in the 1944 election.  
His focus, however, was on the difference between those who identified with the 
“laboring class” as opposed to the “working class.”  Centers found more support 
for Roosevelt among those who identified as part of the laboring class (both 
classes still supported Roosevelt in higher numbers than the middle class) 
(Centers 1950).   
In the 1950s, Heinz Eulau (1956) analyzed other political orientation 
consequences of class identity; respondents had the options of identifying only 
as “middle” or “working class.”  The first issue dealt with the views on “the 
amount of government activity desirable in the fields of unemployment, 
education, housing, and so on” (Eulau 1956: 245-246).  Respondents who 
identified as middle class were more likely to indicate that the government should 
do less, although the relationship was weak.  He also investigated the 
relationship between class identity and political party affiliation, finding that the 
                                            
2 Jackman and Jackman (1983) also discussed possible effects of class identity, 
which are addressed below. 
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majority of the working class respondents identified as Democrats while most of 
the middle class identified as Republicans.  Moreover, those who identified as 
working class saw themselves as better off when Democrats were in office 
(Eulau 1956).   
Two decades later, Mary and Robert Jackman improved on class identity 
research by expanding the array of class categories and paying particular 
attention to the determinants of class identity.  Like Eulau, they also analyzed the 
consequences of class identity, including its effect on political orientations.  As 
previously discussed, one of the key areas where Jackman and Jackman differed 
from Eulau was their use of five classes (poor, working, middle, upper middle, 
and upper) as opposed to only two.  Their analyses, however, did not take upper 
class into consideration due to the small number of respondents that identified as 
upper class in their data (Jackman and Jackman 1983).   
Jackman and Jackman’s (1983) focus was on how respondents viewed 
the government’s role in supporting job guarantees and a minimum income.  In 
each category, the respondents were given the option of Government…“should 
do a lot more,” “do some more,” “is doing about right,” or “should do less” 
(Jackman and Jackman 1983: 203).   The higher the class identity, the lower the 
support for job guarantees, and the poor were more than two times as likely as 
the upper-middle class to feel that government should do more.  A similar pattern 
was found when examining the views on minimum income.  Again, the poor were 
more than twice as likely as the upper middle class (and also more than twice as 
likely as the middle class in this instance) to support the position that the 
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government should do more.  However, class solidarity mattered.  When the 
Jackmans controlled for the strength of class bonds, they found that there was 
not a significant effect of class identity alone on these political issues for those 
who expressed a weak bond to their class.  The relationship did remain for those 
who possessed stronger bonds to their class (Jackman and Jackman 1983).   
Jackman and Jackman also analyzed class identity effects on tax policy.   
As a whole, 53 percent supported a progressive tax while 44 percent supported a 
flat tax.  This pattern held true for all classes except the poor, who were more 
likely to support a progressive tax policy (62 percent) and less likely to support a 
flat tax policy (32 percent).  Thus, class identity had little effect on preferred tax 
policy for most of the population (Jackman and Jackman 1983).  
However, Jackman and Jackman (1983) considered only whites in this 
portion of their research because their data suggested that the attachment of 
black non-poor respondents to their racial identity outweighed their attachment to 
class identity (the attachment was equal for the black poor).  More recent 
research (e.g., Weakliem 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) has also 
suggested no relationship between class and political orientations among African 
Americans. Although he used objective class measures as opposed to the 
subjective measures utilized by the Jackmans, David Weakliem (2001) argued 
that there was no relationship between class and voting for blacks, with close to 
90 percent of blacks voting Democratic. McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal (2006) 
also found that when using income, another objective measure, as a proxy for 
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class, there was no relationship between class and political identity for blacks—
again, with an overwhelming percentage of blacks identifying as Democrats. 
Changing relationship between class and political orientations 
But has the relationship between class identity and political orientations 
changed over the last half-century?  The preponderance of the literature 
addressing trends in class-politics has relied on objective class measures of 
social class.  It is commonly argued that the relationship between class and 
politics has been decreasing in the United States over the last 60 years (Clark, 
Lipset, and Rempel 2001).  As mentioned earlier, studies using the Alford Index 
have shown a decrease in class-induced political preferences and actions over 
the last 60 years of the 20th century (Clark, Lipset, and Rempel 2001), but the 
index has many weaknesses which also were discussed above.  This decrease 
in class-based voting, however, has also been demonstrated by researchers 
using the Erikson-Goldthorpe schema, which utilizes seven classes (Nieuwbeerta 
1995; Nieuwbeerta and De Graff 1999).  This result nevertheless only considers 
data up to the 1980s.   
The proponents of the demise of class politics contend that it is due to 
such factors as class becoming more complex and less polarized (Clark, Lipset, 
and Rempel 2001); an increase in influence of other identities, such as race, 
religion, and other social divisions on politics (Weakliem 2001); and the creation 
of two lefts (i.e., economic liberalism vs. social liberalism) (Clark and Lipset 
2001).  Another reason behind this presumed decrease is an increase in the 
permeability of classes.  In the 20th century, the class within which one is born 
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has much less effect on one’s life chances than it did in the 18th or 19th centuries 
(Hechter 2004).  Similarly, increased educational opportunities and occupational 
shifts have allowed for more opportunities for individuals to interact with those 
from different classes (Hechter 2004: 408).  
There is certainly no dearth of research countering the arguments of the 
declining significance of class on political views and voting patterns (e.g., 
Stonecash 2000; Stonecash and Mariani 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2006; Isaac, Harrison, and Lipold 2008).  When using family income as a proxy, 
the divide between classes3 has recently been increasing when examining its 
effect on voting patterns (Stonecash 2000; Stonecash and Mariani 2000), and 
low income has been found to be a reliable predictor of economic liberalism 
(Houtman 2003).  This same pattern has been demonstrated using election data 
over the last half of the 20th century, with higher income individuals showing an 
increased propensity to support Republican candidates (Stonecash and Mariani 
2000; Stonecash et al. 2000; McCarty, Pool, and Rosenthal 2006) as well as 
being more likely to identify as Republican (McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 
2006).  In addition, similar trends have been found when analyzing how 
individuals feel toward each party, with the less affluent feeling increasingly 
positive about the Democratic Party and negative about the Republican Party.  
The more affluent have remained mostly positive toward the latter (Stonecash 
2000). 
                                            
3 Income categories are < $20,000; $20-29,999; $30-49,999; $50,000+ 
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There are many claims about why the relationship between income and 
political orientations has strengthened, much of it relating to increased income 
inequalities and a more pronounced conservative/liberal divide in politics and 
among politicians (Stonecash and Mariani 2000).  Moreover, the Democratic 
Party has increasingly supported more economically liberal positions, including 
the support for welfare and increased government funding for education and 
healthcare (Erikson and Wright 1997; Stonecash et al. 2000; Stonecash and 
Mariani 2000).  The Republican Party, on the other hand, has become 
increasingly conservative, typically opposing the above mentioned programs 
supported by Democrats and strengthening their support for free markets (Hout, 
Manza, and Brooks 1999; Stonecash et al 2000; Stonecash and Mariani 2000).   
What one must keep in mind when reviewing the debate about the 
increase in class politics is its reliance on income as a proxy for class.  Although 
income and social class are highly correlated (Schooler and Schoenbach 1994) 
and some use income interchangeably with class (e.g., Stonecash et al 2000; 
Stonecash and Mariani 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006), one must 
keep in mind that it is only one dimension of class.  It does not take into account 
other indicators, such as occupational prestige, workplace dynamics, and 
education, which are influential in class identity (Jackman and Jackman 1983); 
nor does it consider factors such as lifestyles, social status, and culture (Clark 
and Lipset 2001). 
The preponderance of research on change in class politics, however, 
relies on objective class measurements.  The most recent research that takes 
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subjective class identity into account (Jackman and Jackman 1983) relies on 
data from one point in time and does not consider how the impact of class on 
political orientation may or may not have changed over time.  We simply do not 
know how, if at all, the class identity-political orientations relationship may be 
changing over time.  This is the void that I seek to fill. 
 
Central Hypotheses 
Based on the foregoing discussion, I propose to test the following race-specific 
and temporal change hypotheses.  
Hypothesis 1a: Among whites, I expect respondents who identify with higher 
classes to also identify with more conservative party tendencies; I also expect the 
same in aggregate because overall patterns are driven by more numerous white 
respondents. 
Hypothesis1b: Among blacks, I expect class identity and party tendencies to be 
independent of each other. 
Hypothesis 2a: Among whites, I expect class identity to be positively related to 
economic conservatism; I also expect the same in aggregate because overall 
patterns are driven by more numerous white respondents. 
Hypothesis 2b: Among blacks, I expect class identity and economic conservatism 
to be independent of each other. 
Hypothesis 3a: Over time, if the increasing significance of class argument is 
correct, I expect the strength of the relationship between class identity and 
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conservatism among whites to increase and possibly begin to appear among 
blacks. 
Hypothesis 3b: Over time, if the decreasing significance of class argument is 
correct, I expect the strength of the relationship between class identity and 
conservatism among whites to decrease. 
Hypothesis 3c: Over time, I expect class identity and conservatism among blacks 
to be independent of each other. 
 
Data and Methods 
My analysis builds on and extends Jackman and Jackman (1983) by 
examining class identity’s influence on political orientations of U.S. adults in 
general, specific to race, and addressing possible historical changes in the 
relationship over the last several decades.  The data come from the General 
Social Survey (GSS), a nation-wide survey administered by the National Opinion 
Research Center at the University of Chicago.  Surveys began in 1972 and were 
conducted annually until 1994 (except for 1979, 1981, and 1992).  During this 
time, the sample sizes ranged from 1372 to 1613 (with a target of 1500).  Black 
respondents were oversampled in 1982 and 1987, and I adjust for that in the 
subsequent results.  Since 1994, the GSS has been administered every even 
numbered year using two samples, each with the target size of 1500.  The actual 
total sample sizes have been between 2756 and 2992.4  Because of continuity in 
questions dealing with the key variables in the present study, the GSS repeated 
                                            
4 http://gss.norc.org/gss_faqs.asp 
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cross-sections can be used to gauge social trends.  All available years were used 
for each response variable considered (the exact years used are indicated on the 
tables).   
My key independent variable is class identity (see Table 1 for full details 
on variables).  The response options given in the GSS are “lower class,” “working 
class,” “middle class,” and “upper class.”  Class identity is treated as ordinal and 
coded 1 to 4 (lower class to upper class).  The general dependent variable is 
political conservatism, measured in two ways.  The first is by party identification, 
in which the respondents are given the options of “strong Democrat,” “not strong 
Democrat,” “independent/near Democrat,” “independent,” “independent/near 
Republican,” “not strong Republican,” “strong Republican,” and “other party.”  
Party identity is also treated as ordinal with coding from 1 to 7 for increasing 
conservative tendencies (strong Democrat to strong Republican).  The “other 
party” category was not considered in the present analysis.   
The second way in which conservatism is measured is in political 
orientations regarding economic policy issues, which include three separate 
variables concerning the views of the government’s role: government spending 
on welfare, government spending on social security, and government 
responsibility to reduce income differences.  The possible responses to the first 
two questions are “too little,” “about right,” and “too much.”  As with party 
identification, these variables are treated as ordinal and coded 1-3 as levels of 
conservatism increase (from too little government spending to too much).  For 
the view on income difference, the responses are on a scale from 1 to 7, with one 
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meaning government should reduce the difference and seven being the 
government should take no action (the more economically conservative position).  
As with the other economic conservatism variables, this is treated as ordinal, 
keeping the original coding which follows the increase in conservatism.   
I control for a wide variety of variables that past research has suggested 
may be important.  With prior literature (e.g., Jackman and Jackman 1983; 
Weakliem 2001; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) demonstrating no 
relationship between class and political orientations for blacks, it is important to 
control for race.  Sex is controlled due to the gender gap in voting; women are 
more likely to support Democratic candidates as well as liberal policies in the 
United States (Inglehart and Norris 2000; Edlund and Pande 2002; Kaufmann 
2002; Box-Steffensmeier et al. 2004).  With recent polls suggesting that younger 
Americans are embracing liberal policies and identifying as liberal at a higher rate 
than older Americans (Nagourney and Thee 2007; Soltis 2009) as well as 
literature suggesting a similar relationship from the middle of the century through 
the early 1970s (e.g., Knoke and Hout 1974), age is an important control variable 
as well.  In addition to an inverse relationship shown between years of education 
and identification with the Republican Party in this same period (Knoke and Hout 
1974), a recent poll conducted by the Pew Research Center (2005) 
demonstrated that a higher percentage of college graduates as well as 
individuals with a postgraduate experience identify as liberal.  Earlier literature by 
Wiener and Eckland (1979) has shown a similar relationship between education 
and political orientations (also see Houtman 2001), so I also control for 
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education.  Income5 is controlled to be certain that any significant relationships 
between class identity and political orientations are not spurious due to an 
indirect influence of income through class identity.  This is especially important 
since prior literature (e.g., Stonecash et al. 2000; Stonecash and Mariani 2000; 
McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) demonstrates a significant relationship 
between income and political orientations.  Marital status has also been shown to 
influence political orientations, with single people being more likely to vote for 
Democrats than married people (Weakliem 2001); therefore, I control for marital 
status.  The last control is religion, which is based on prior literature 
demonstrating that Catholics and Jews are more likely to support Democratic 
candidates than are Protestants (Weakliem 2001).  Table 1 reports the 
measurement details and descriptive statistics for all dependent and independent 
variables employed below. 
 
Findings 
 Table 2 presents the unstandardized coefficients from multiple regression 
models6 predicting conservative party identification and conservative views on 
the government’s role in reducing the income gap.  Table 3 presents the models 
predicting conservative views on social security and welfare.  In both Tables 2  
                                            
5 The categories for income used were developed prior to the 1972 survey and 
are out of date for the later responses, with “$25,000 or more” being the highest 
income option.  Although the income variable has been updated for later years, 
the original scale is used in my analyses for continuity.   
6 All regressions reported herein are OLS estimates.  While the linearity of class 
category relations was examined and found to hold (Appendix), it might be 
worthwhile for future research to use an ordered logistic regression estimator 
rather than OLS.  
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Table 1: Measurement of Independent, Dependent, and Control Variables and Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Description  Metric Mean7 S.D. 
Independent Variable     
Class Identity        
(CLASS) 
In which social class would 
you say you belong? 
1 = lower class; 
2 = working class; 
3 = middle class; 
4 = upper class 
2.48 0.64 
Dependent Variables     
Political Party       
(PARTYID) 
Generally speaking, do you 
usually think of yourself as a 
Republican, Democrat, 
Independent, or what? 
1 = strong Dem; 
2 = mod Dem;          
3 = ind, leaning Dem; 
4 = independent; 
5 = ind, leaning Rep; 
6 = mod Rep; 
7 = strong Rep 
3.70 1.99 
Welfare        
(NATFARE) 
Opinion on government's 
spending on welfare 
1 = too little; 
2 = about right; 
3 = too much 
2.29 0.78 
Social Security         
(NATSOC) 
Opinion on government's 
spending of social security  
1 = too little; 
2 = about right; 
3 = too much 
1.49 0.61 
Reduction on 
income gap 
(EQWLTH) 
Opinion on government's 
responsibility to reduce income 
gap between rich and poor 
1 = reduce  
difference to  
7 = no action 
3.73 1.96 
Control Variables     
White* Race is white 0=no; 1=yes 0.82 0.39 
Black Race is black 0=no; 1=yes 0.13 0.34 
Other Race Race is other 0=no; 1=yes 0.05 0.22 
Male Sex is male 0=no; 1=yes 0.46 0.50 
Female* Sex is female 0=no; 1=yes 0.54 0.50 
Married* Is married 0=no; 1=yes 0.62 0.49 
Widowed Is widowed 0=no; 1=yes 0.07 0.25 
Divorced  Is divorced 0=no; 1=yes 0.09 0.28 
Separated Is separated 0=no; 1=yes 0.03 0.16 
Never Married Has never been married 0=no; 1=yes 0.20 0.40 
Protestant* Protestant religious affiliation 0=no; 1=yes 0.59 0.49 
Catholic Catholic religious affiliation 0=no; 1=yes 0.26 0.44 
Jewish Jewish religious affiliation 0=no; 1=yes 0.02 0.14 
None No religious affiliation 0=no; 1=yes 0.10 0.30 
Other8 Other religious affiliation 0=no; 1=yes 0.02 0.13 
Age Respondent's Age 18-89+ 44.12 16.96 
Education Highest year of school 
completed 
0-20 12.68 3.12 
Income Total Family Income 1: Less than $1000        
to 12: $25,000+ 
10.13 2.73 
                                            
7 Mean and SD are from aggregated samples for all available years 
8 Beginning in 1998, Buddhism, Hinduism, Other Eastern, Moslem/Islam, Orthodox-Christian, Christian, 
Native American, Inter-Nondenominational categories were added.  These have been aggregated into 
“Other” 
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22 
and 3, model 1 includes all races and treats class identity in an additive fashion; 
model 2 includes all races and tests for interaction effects between class and 
race; model 3 and model 4 are similar to model 1, except the former only 
includes only white respondents, while the latter includes only black respondents.   
  In support of H1a, there is tendency for whites who identify with higher 
classes to affiliate toward more conservative Republican Party identification, net 
of other factors.  This relationship holds true both with and without interaction 
effects between class and race (model 1 and model 2, respectively).  With all 
races combined, this relationship remains and is driven by the large percentage 
of white respondents in the aggregate.  As expected, model 4 demonstrates a 
non-significant relationship between class identity and party identification for 
black respondents.   
 The results in Table 2 and Table 3 also provide support for hypotheses 
dealing with economic conservatism.  White respondents in higher classes 
express greater conservatism on each of the three policies (views on the 
government’s role in decreasing the income gap, social security, and welfare), in 
support of H2a.  Again, the large number of white respondents relative to other 
races leads to a similar relationship in the aggregate.  When black respondents 
are analyzed separately, there are mixed results.  Counter to H2b, we find similar 
patterns to white respondents for the income gap and social security variables.  
However, there is no substantial relationship between class identity and views on 
welfare for black respondents, which is consistent with H2b.  
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 The above findings are consistent with the prior literature including the 
Jackman and Jackman study (1983), which also demonstrated a positive 
relationship between class and economic conservatism for white respondents.  
With whites representing the overwhelming majority of respondents, the results 
for all races are also in line with previous literature (e.g., Centers 1950; Eulau 
1956; Jackman and Jackman 1983).  Although it initially appears for black 
respondents that there is a significant positive relationship between class and 
views on the government reducing the gap between the rich and poor as well as 
social security, as addressed below, this relationship does not hold when the 
variables are broken down by year.  Instead, the results become relatively 
consistent with the prior literature concerning blacks and class identity, which 
suggests (1) that black racial identity trumps class identity (Jackman and 
Jackman 1983), (2) a lack of relationship between class identity and voting 
(Weakliem 2001), and (3) no relationship between income and political identity 
(McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).   
 The findings in Tables 4 and 5 address arguments about how class 
identity’s influence on political views might have changed over time.  These 
tables present the unstandardized coefficients from multiple regression models 
addressing class identity’s effect on conservatism separated by race (white and 
black) for each available year, net of the same control variables applied in Table 
2.
 
 
 
 
 Notes: Variables controlled are the same as Tables 2 and 3; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05     ** p < .01     ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 4: Class Identity Effects by Race Over Time: Political Party and Income Policy 
 _______Party ID_______ ______Income Gap_____ 
Year Whites Blacks Whites Blacks 
1973 .355 
(.141) 
.038 
(.306) 
-- -- 
1974 .347*** 
(.098) 
.023 
(.213) 
-- -- 
1975 .302** 
(.095) 
.216 
(.196) 
-- -- 
1976 .223* 
(.094) 
.281 
(.222) 
-- -- 
1977 .321** 
(.098) 
.233 
(.210) 
-- -- 
1978 .230* 
(.096) 
.110 
(.194) 
.473*** 
(.142) 
-.279 
(.295) 
1980 .082 
(.093) 
-.117 
(.173) 
.291** 
(.096) 
.199 
(.253) 
1982 .246* 
(.098) 
.132 
(.090) 
-- -- 
1983 .251 
(.133) 
.284 
(.274) 
.550*** 
(.137) 
.325 
(.372) 
1984 .278** 
(.103) 
.425* 
(.204) 
.223* 
(.102) 
-.034 
(.240) 
1985 .422*** 
(.098) 
.203 
(.188) 
-- -- 
1986 .499*** 
(.096) 
-.163 
(.181) 
.599*** 
(.096) 
.461* 
(.224) 
1987 .357*** 
(.099) 
-.076 
(.100) 
.288** 
(.093) 
-.206 
(.128) 
1988 .345*** 
(.108) 
-.107 
(.192) 
.453*** 
(.125) 
-.086 
(.258) 
1989 .511*** 
(.102) 
-.023 
(.176) 
.410*** 
(.111) 
.492* 
(.227) 
1990 .277* 
(.110) 
-.542* 
(.257) 
.473*** 
(.133) 
-.117 
(.289) 
1991 .416*** 
(.109) 
.476** 
(.183) 
.418*** 
(.122) 
.127 
(.217) 
1993 .214* 
(.095) 
-.046 
(.201) 
.058 
(.112) 
.062 
(.244) 
1994 .336*** 
(.074) 
.347** 
(.124) 
.378*** 
(.083) 
.110 
(.192) 
1996 .331*** 
(.071) 
.230 
(.122) 
.279*** 
(.084) 
.383 
(.198) 
1998 .355*** 
(.073) 
-.087 
(.122) 
.527*** 
(.090) 
.112 
(.187) 
2000 .159* 
(.071) 
.355** 
(.128) 
.360*** 
(.086) 
-.045 
(.198) 
2002 .237** 
(.075) 
-.163 
(.114) 
.330* 
(.132) 
-.160 
(.281) 
2004 .283*** 
(.080) 
.204 
(.122) 
.319* 
(.131) 
-.051 
(.363) 
2006 .203** 
(.076) 
-.092 
(.119) 
.478*** 
(.089) 
.420* 
(.188) 
 Notes: Variables controlled are the same as Tables 2 and 3; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05     ** p < .01     ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Table 5: Class Identity Effects by Race Over Time: Social Security and Welfare Policy 
 ____Social Security____ _______Welfare_______ 
Year Whites Blacks Whites Blacks 
1973 -- -- .107* 
(.053) 
-.053 
(.120) 
1974 -- -- .058 
(.039) 
-.021 
(.099) 
1975 -- -- .010 
(.041) 
.105 
(.092) 
1976 -- -- .058 
(.036) 
-.121 
(.136) 
1977 -- -- -.008 
(.034) 
-.023 
(.110) 
1978 -- -- -.003 
(.034) 
-.033 
(.099) 
1980 -- -- .093** 
(.034) 
-.195 
(.104) 
1982 -- -- -.024 
(.039) 
.064 
(.056) 
1983 -- -- .046 
(.054) 
-.023 
(.174) 
1984 .074 
(.045) 
.060 
(.100) 
-.075 
(.068) 
.113 
(.188) 
1985 .079** 
(.031) 
-.059 
(.070) 
.090 
(.051) 
-.166 
(.206) 
1986 .078* 
(.031) 
-.034 
(.073) 
.120* 
(.056) 
-.175 
(.136) 
1987 .089** 
(.031) 
.016 
(.040) 
.127 
(.069) 
-.086 
(.105) 
1988 .097** 
(.033) 
.092 
(.074) 
.021 
(.063) 
-.023 
(.136) 
1989 .120*** 
(.030) 
.011 
(.058) 
.146** 
(.055) 
.119 
(.144) 
1990 .111*** 
(.034) 
.051 
(.076) 
.102 
(.063) 
-.217 
(.176) 
1991 .098** 
(.032) 
.015 
(.061) 
.090 
(.058) 
-.096 
(.141) 
1993 .128*** 
(.030) 
.217** 
(.074) 
.125* 
(.051) 
-.016 
(.172) 
1994 .097*** 
(.023) 
.029 
(.048) 
.061 
(.035) 
.076 
(.106) 
1996 .129*** 
(.024) 
.050 
(.049) 
.072* 
(.036) 
.078 
(.110) 
1998 .093*** 
(.025) 
.058 
(.045) 
.011 
(.039) 
.010 
(.090) 
2000 .081*** 
(.023) 
.086* 
(.041) 
-.019 
(.040) 
-.139 
(.100) 
2002 .104*** 
(.023) 
-.009 
(.039) 
-.029 
(.039) 
-.087 
(.085) 
2004 .090*** 
(.023) 
.100* 
(.041) 
.060 
(.043) 
-179 
(.107) 
2006 .130*** 
(.023) 
.0 
(.041) 
.078 
(.044) 
.085 
(.099) 
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The results shown in Table 4 and Table 5 do not support H3a, which 
predicted an increase in the influence of class identity on conservatism over time.  
However, the declining significance of class hypothesis (H3b) was not supported 
either.  When the year-specific class effects for white party identification, income 
gap, and social security (the three most class-induced outcomes) are treated as 
separate time-series and regressed on a time trend variable, time is consistently 
non-significant, demonstrating a clear lack of trend in the coefficients.10  There 
does not appear to be any significant temporal pattern in the relationship 
between class identity and conservatism for white respondents.  Instead, class 
identity’s effect on conservative party identification for white respondents is quite 
stable over the period between 1973 and 2006.  The only years without a 
significant relationship are 1973, 1980, and 1983.  Similarly, there is a consistent 
positive effect on the income gap and social security variables as well, with those 
identifying with higher classes being more likely to support more conservative 
viewpoints, although the effect is smaller than in the case of party ID.  Between 
1978 and 2006, the only exception for the income gap variable is 1993, and the 
only exception for the social security variable is 1984 (between 1984 and 2006).  
Although Table 2 demonstrates an increase in conservative views on welfare as 
class identity increases for whites, this relationship is non-significant for the vast 
majority of the years between 1973 and 2006.  The years in which a positive 
relationship remains are in 1973, 1980, 1986, 1989, 1993, and 1996.  This lack of 
                                            
10 The three time trend coefficients are: -.001, -.003, and -.002 with p-values of 
.843, .614, and .083 respectively.  Note also that these coefficients form an 
imperfect time-series because coefficients do not exist for all contiguous years, a 
consequence of survey irregularity in the GSS. 
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a pattern found in class identity’s influence over the respective dependent 
variables contradicts both those who argue that the class-politics relationship is 
decreasing (e.g., Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta and De Graff 1999; Clark, 
Lipset, and Rempel 2001; Clark and Lipset 2001; Weakliem 2001) and those who 
argue that it has been increasing (e.g., Stonecash 2000; Stonecash and Mariani 
2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).  At least in the case of class 
identity’s influence on political orientations in America, the story is largely one of 
stability, rather than change in either direction. 
 The lack of a pattern for black respondents is evident as well.  With a few 
exceptions, this provides support for H3c, which predicted a consistent non-
significant relationship between class identity and conservatism for black 
respondents.  For conservative party identity, the exceptions are in 1984, 1990, 
1991,1994, and 2000, which all reveal a significant positive effect of class 
identity.  The only exceptions for the income gap variable are 1986,1989, and 
2006, each of which has a significant positive net effect.  When analyzing class 
identity’s effect on the views of social security, 1993, 2000, and 2004 are the only 
years in which there is a significant net effect, and it is positive for each.   Among 
black respondents, the views on welfare are not significantly influenced by class 
identity in any year.  Overall, with few exceptions, the analyses indicate a 
consistent independence between class identity and conservatism for black 
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respondents over time, with persons in higher classes espousing no more 
conservative views than those in the classes below.11 
 
Limitations and Future Research 
The findings reported above should be viewed with several limitations of 
the GSS in mind, limitations that also point toward lines of future research.  The 
first concerns the inability to control for the strength of class bonds, which had a 
significant interaction effect with class identity in Jackman and Jackman’s (1983) 
                                            
11 The General Social Surveys also provides a POLVIEWS variable, which asks 
respondents to rate their political views on a 7-point scale from “Extremely 
Liberal” to “Extremely Conservative.”  Although I am attempting to understand 
class identity’s effect on conservatism, I hesitate to use POLVIEWS as a key 
response variable due to framing that has been successful to a great extent in 
turning “liberal” into a pejorative term in recent history (Mark 2007).  In some 
circles, liberal has been equated to a “Communist sympathizer who was soft on 
crime and favored redistributing income” (Mark 2007: 237).  Moreover, it has 
been common practice for Republican strategists to encourage politicians to 
lump “liberal” together with negative terms such as, “sick,” “pathetic,” 
“incompetent,” and “traitor” (Mark 2007:236) as well as used in opposition to 
“democratic” in some instances (Cepik 2006).  An example of the pejorative use 
of liberal includes the numerous “accusations” of Michael Dukakis being too 
liberal by George H.W. Bush in the 1988 election (Hayakawa and Hayakawa 
1991). And although the use of “liberal” has lost some of its pejorative strength 
(Mark 2007), as recently as the 2008 campaign for president, Democratic 
politicians have still shied away from the term.  For example, when asked 
whether she would identify as liberal, Hillary Clinton preferred to use 
“progressive” to describe herself (Kuhn 2007).  This demonstrates how a 
negative connotation still surrounds “liberal.”  
 Taking the above into consideration, the regressions for POLVIEWS can 
be found in Appendices 3 and 4.  When the data from 1973-2006 are 
aggregated, there is a significant positive effect of class identity on POLVIEWS 
for white respondents (as well as all races combined), but not black respondents.  
However, when broken down by year, class identity and POLVIEWS are 
independent of each other almost all years for both races.  The only exceptions 
are 1978, 1986, and 1996 for white respondents and 1980 and 1983 for black 
respondents.  All of those years demonstrated a significant positive relationship 
except for 1980, which had a significant negative relationship.   
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study.  They found that when they controlled for solidarity, there was a significant 
relationship between class identity and political orientations only for those who 
had strong bonds to their class. There was not a significant effect of class identity 
on political orientations for those respondents who had weak class bonds 
(Jackman and Jackman 1983).  Given the lack of data on class bonds,12 I could 
not replicate this aspect of the Jackman’s research.  Because there is reason to 
believe that salience of class bonds or solidarity with class matters by enhancing 
the political impact of identity (see also Hechter 2004: 403), results reported here 
(which cannot assess class bond strength) quite likely understate class identity 
effects.  Thus, my findings should be viewed as conservative tests of the class 
identity effect.  It would be valuable for future survey designs to include a 
measure of class bonds when studying class identity.  
 Second, I examined a limited set of measures of economic conservatism. 
Other issues that might also be shaped by class identity include views on tax 
policy, free trade, government-run healthcare, government intervention in the free 
market, and so on.  Though not identical, it is reasonable to predict that these 
variables are highly correlated with the variables used in my analyses.    
 In addition to the limited number of variables considered, one—views on 
welfare—might have questionable validity.  This is in large part due to the 
successful campaign briefly discussed above, which has given the term a 
                                            
12 In 2004, the General Social Survey included a question asking the respondents 
about the 3 most important groups to which individuals belongs.  The options 
included class, occupation, race, religion, political party, etc. (10 choices in total).  
Class was chosen by 2.1, 6.3, and 10.3 percent of the respondents as the most, 
second most, and third most important group respectively.  Of note, no class was 
more likely than another to identify strongly with its class. 
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negative connotation.  This is not limited to those on the right, such as Ronald 
Reagan in the late 1970s and the 1980s, but also much of the mass media, 
which has promoted the negative stereotypes about those who receive welfare.  
Such examples include the image of “predatory (emphasis mine) black folks 
living high on the hog off the taxpayers’ dollars” (hooks 2000: 124).  This has 
helped promote the idea that resources of those whites not on welfare are stolen 
by blacks receiving welfare13 (hooks 2000), which has helped to lead to the 
negative view of welfare in general.  
A third limitation is related to the GSS measure of views on social security.  
Unlike the other variables, which were in the GSS from the 1970s on, the social 
security question was not placed on the survey until 1984.  This still allows for 
generalizations to be made about the trend, but it would be beneficial to have 
data going back further in time.14 
Fourth, the response options the GSS provides for class identity—lower, 
working, middle and upper—are not optimal.  As agued by Jackman and 
Jackman, “lower class” possesses a negative connotation; therefore, they 
replaced “lower class” with “poor” in their survey.  They also used a fifth category, 
upper-middle class, which allowed middle class to truly be in the center of 
possible responses (Jackman and Jackman 1983).  With this in mind, I would 
                                            
13 There are obviously issues of racism at work in the campaign against welfare 
as well, which are not addressed in this paper, including the portrayal of welfare 
recipients as people of color when the overwhelming majority of recipients are 
white (Quadagno 1994; hooks 2000). 
14 Prior research (i.e., Shapiro and Smith 1985) suggests that there were not 
reliable and consistent measures of the opinions on social security between 1935 
and 1985. 
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argue that the research would be better served by utilizing the Jackmans’ model 
of class identities.  With this strategy, however, it is important to keep in mind the 
potential for a bias toward the middle response variable.   
 Fifth, it might be worth examining other dimensions of economic 
conservatism.  Another important avenue for future research would be to 
determine whether the voting patterns and trends that have been demonstrated 
in previous research using income as a proxy for class (e.g., Stonecash 2000; 
Stonecash and Mariani 2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006) are similar 
when using class identity instead.   
Sixth, the present analysis examined class-race interactions.  But class 
(and racial) identities are also gendered.  Therefore, future work on the impact of 
class identities should take class-gender interactions seriously as well. 
 Seventh, the present study assumed that class identity shapes political 
orientations but the reverse does not occur.  This is a potential source of 
simultaneity bias if political orientations in fact influence class identity.  Future 
research should examine this assumption to rule out the possibility of reciprocal 
determination.   
 With the current focus in popular media on the so-called changing political 
viewpoints of the working class, future research concerning class politics could 
center on the working class.  This might focus on how the working class differs 
from the other classes in its political orientations as well as the changes or lack of 
changes in these orientations over recent history and what mediating factors 
might exist within this relationship. 
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 Finally, another direction that can be taken is to analyze how this 
relationship between class identity and political orientations might be affected by 
some upper class individuals attempting to maintain their position while at the 
same time blocking others from class advancement, as argued by bell hooks 
(2000) and Diana Kendall (2006).  Future analyses could demonstrate whether 
differing views in policies are or are not related to protecting one’s class position.  
This could be attempted using an ethnographic strategy similar to Kendall’s 
(2006) “Class in the United States” with the added focus on how the attempt of 
the upper class to create boundaries might influence the political positions they 
take.    
 
Concluding Discussion 
 Despite these limitations, this study advances our knowledge of the role of 
class identity in contemporary America.  I began with the question of whether 
class identity mattered in any significant way in contemporary American society.  
Specifically, I asked if class identity served to shape political party identification 
and political orientations toward government policy issues.  With the majority of 
the research on the subject focusing on the impact of objective class on political 
orientation, class identity has largely been ignored with the exceptions of Heinz 
Eulau in the 1950s and Mary and Robert Jackman in the 1970s.  Building upon 
the research of Jackman and Jackman (1983), I analyzed the possible influence 
of class identity on two major fronts—political party identification and economic 
conservatism surrounding government distributional policies.    
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 In general, my findings suggest that those white respondents who identify 
with higher classes also tend to hold more economically conservative views, with 
the exception of welfare.  However, I hypothesize that the lack of continuity of 
economic conservative views with regards to welfare may be attributed to the 
stigma attached to the term and the negative valence associated with welfare 
recipients created in a long history of classification struggles (Quadagno 1994; 
Goldberg 2008), including recent framing by the right wing, perhaps invigorated 
by Ronald Reagan’s use of the pejorative term “welfare queen” in the 1976 
election.  This is an issue that deserves further investigation. 
Although class identity and views on welfare are independent of each 
other, there still remains support for the effect of class identity on the remaining 
two economic conservatism variables (views on social security and the 
government’s role in decreasing the gap between the rich and the poor).  Hence, 
class identity does matter, at least for these political orientations, which remain 
relevant and highly contentious in the current political arena.  Moreover, these 
orientations can have an important impact on the political process.  This can be 
demonstrated in the influence of public opinion polls on government policies, with 
many politicians spending both time and money to keep track of citizens’ views 
on important issues (Cook, Barabas, and Page 2002).  For example, I would 
argue that George W. Bush’s failure to push through his plan to privatize social 
security was significantly affected by the lack of support in public polls, with a 
2005 Gallup Poll showing 56 percent of respondents opposing the privatization.15  
                                            
15 http://www.pollingreport.com/social.htm 
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Additionally, orientations play an important role in the electorate’s voting 
decisions (Beck et al. 2002), 
In addition, this relationship of class identity with party identification and 
economic conservatism has remained relatively stable over the past few 
decades.  This appears to conflict with both the literature suggesting a decrease 
in class politics (e.g., Nieuwbeerta 1995; Nieuwbeerta and De Graff 1999; Clark, 
Lipset, and Rempel 2001; Clark and Lipset 2001; Weakliem 2001) as well as 
those who argue its increase (e.g., Stonecash 2000; Stonecash and Mariani 
2000; McCarty, Poole, and Rosenthal 2006).  However, it is important to keep in 
mind that prior research analyzing trends has relied on objective class measures 
as opposed to subjective class measures addressed here.  The research (i.e., 
Eulau 1956; Jackman and Jackman 1983) focusing on class identity and political 
orientations has only measured specific points in time (most recently using data 
from the 1970s) and has not addressed trends.   
Although this positive relationship between class identity and political 
conservatism does not hold true for black respondents,16 the results nonetheless 
demonstrate that class identity, at least in the realm of politics, still has relevant 
consequences and has an impact on political orientations of a majority of adult 
Americans.  These findings run contrary to those who argue that class is no 
longer a relevant concept in today’s society (e.g., Pakulski and Waters 1996; 
Kingston 2000; Pakulski 2001).  It also provides empirical evidence to oppose 
                                            
16 With blacks, however, not being a homogenous group, there is a chance that 
class may in fact matter for some subset, which is certainly worthy of further 
exploration.   
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views popularized by the media and books—like What’s the Matter with Kansas, 
written by Thomas Frank—such as the conservative nature of the white working 
class as compared to the other classes.  At least in terms of their political party 
affiliation and views on such economic issues as the government’s role in 
decreasing the income gap as well as social security, this is not the case.  
Appendices 1 and 2 (model 2 for each variable) confirm that although the white 
working class individuals might be more conservative in their political orientation 
and opinions on these economic issues than lower class respondents, they still 
remain less conservative than both the middle and upper classes.  The patterns 
in Appendices 1 and 2 also confirm the linear relationship of class categories 
implied by Tables 2 and 3 for white respondents for the above-mentioned 
variables.17  In other words when the data are aggregated for all available years, 
there is a positive linear relationship, with white respondents who identify with 
higher classes holding more conservative political orientations.  This pattern 
holds true for all response variables other than views on welfare.  Combining this 
demonstrated relationship with the consistent class effect shown over time in 
Tables 4 and 5 leads to further confirmation that when it comes to issues of party 
identification and economics (at least on those measures presently discussed), 
                                            
17 Appendices 2 and 3 show some interesting nonlinear class effects for blacks. 
For Party ID, while the working and lower classes are no more likely to identify 
with increasingly conservative party tendencies, the upper class is.  However, the 
working class respondents remain more conservative than the lower class in 
terms of their views on welfare, while the middle and upper classes are not 
significantly different from the lower class.  This might be worth future 
exploration.   
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white working class Americans are not more conservative than the middle or 
upper classes and in fact, remain politically to the left of those classes.   
Class identity has not been given sufficient attention in the current identity 
politics literature (Aronowitz 1992), which has focused more on other identities, 
such as race or ethnicity (e.g, di Leonardo 1994; Nelson 2002), gender (e.g., 
Plutzer and Zipp 1993; Orr 2007), religion (e.g., Gallaher 2002; Miceli 2005), and 
sexual orientation (e.g., Phelan 1993; Miceli 2005).   Although there might be an 
increased salience of such identities (e.g.,Weakliem 2001; Walsh 2004), I have 
demonstrated that class identity still holds sway in matters of political party 
identification and political orientations; hence, class remains an important identity 
in predicting political outcomes and an area that identity politics literature 
unnecessarily overlooks.  More importantly, my analyses provide limited but 
nonetheless important evidence that counters the argument that class no longer 
matters in the contemporary society.  Although some may still argue that class 
remains irrelevant because it does not predict behavior in the aggregate (e.g., 
Kingston 2000), my results suggest otherwise.  I contend that a significant 
influence in a specific area as consequential as political dispositions (which can 
in turn, influence such outcomes as voting and public policies) supports the 
argument that class remains a relevant concept in social science research as 
well as in modern American society as a whole.  More importantly, with the 
evidence demonstrating a continued significance, there is a need for further 
exploration of class identity, including a better understanding of both the factors 
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that influence this identity and its consequences, both in political outcomes not 
presently addressed as well as other facets of everyday life.   
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 Notes: Variables controlled are the same as Appendix 3; Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05     ** p < .01     ***p < .001 (two-tailed tests) 
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Appendix D: Class Identity Effects by Race Over Time: POLVIEWS 
 _______Polviews_______ 
Year Whites Blacks 
1973 -- 
 
-- 
 
1974 -.024 
(.064) 
.063 
(.175) 
1975 .029 
(.067) 
-.099 
(.196) 
1976 .033 
(.067) 
-.182 
(.214) 
1977 -.071 
(.065) 
.221 
(.226) 
1978 .126* 
(.063) 
-.067 
(.185) 
1980 -.025 
(.063) 
-.473* 
(.188) 
1982 .033 
(.067) 
-.029 
(.110) 
1983 .128 
(.085) 
.857* 
(.354) 
1984 -.001 
(.068) 
.218 
(.213) 
1985 .073 
(.064) 
.272 
(.237) 
1986 .170** 
(.062) 
-.032 
(.134) 
1987 .074 
(.065) 
-.195 
(.109) 
1988 .006 
(.072) 
.056 
(.197) 
1989 .160 
(.066) 
.180 
(.191) 
1990 .072 
(.074) 
-.106 
(.215) 
1991 .093 
(.071) 
-.082 
(.175) 
1993 .026 
(.063) 
-.131 
(.196) 
1994 .050 
(.051) 
.292* 
(.130) 
1996 .123* 
(.050) 
.158 
(.130) 
1998 .092 
(.054) 
-.148 
(.114) 
2000 .013 
(.053) 
.081 
(.117) 
2002 -.132 
(.075) 
-.043 
(.186) 
2004 .144 
(.073) 
-.104 
(.217) 
2006 .030 
(.053) 
-.071 
(.119) 
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